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THE CORE OF A PARTITION FUNCTION GAME
LA´SZLO´ A´. KO´CZY
Abstract. We consider partition function games and introduce new defini-
tions of the core that include the effects of externalities. We assume that all
players behave rationally and that all stable outcomes arising are consistent
with the appropriate generalised concept of the core. The result is a recursive
definition of the core where residual subgames are considered as games with
fewer players and with a partition function that captures the externalities of
the deviating coalition. Some properties of the new concepts are discussed.
1. Introduction
The core has become one of the most popular solutions in coalitional game
theory [1, 2, 7, 12, 13]. Informally, the core is the set of undominated outcomes.
An outcome is not in the core if there is a coalition that can profitably deviate from
it. The core is determined by the inspection of the characteristic function.
Recently there is a strong revival of interest in games in the more general par-
tition function form [6, 10, 16, 18]. In partition function form games (PFGs),
introduced by Thrall and Lucas [15], coalitional payoffs are defined as a function
of the entire coalition structure or partition.
In PFGs a deviation by a coalition or a set of coalitions typically affects the
payoffs of the residual players thus invoking a response from them. Such a response
can change the worth of the deviation dramatically, as the externalities, in general,
go both ways making the definition domination a lot less obvious. Already the
introductory paper [15] defined domination in this new context and their definition
is what we will call later as the (classical) pessimistic approach where it is assumed
that in a deviation residual players minimise the payoff of the deviators. This idea
has been used in most of the early papers [8, 9] together with its complement, the
optimistic approach where residuals maximise the deviators’ payoffs [14, 17]. Funaki
and Yamato [6] use both and find that the two approaches lead to contradictory
conclusions.
Cornet [4] in his summary describes a further one; the status quo approach
assumes that residual players do not react, which is clearly inconsistent with the
partition function form often used explicitly to model externalities.
Tulkens and Chander [16] use a pre-determined residual partition assuming that
the residual coalitions break up to singletons. D’Aspremont, Jacquemin, Gab-
szewicz and Weymark [5] assume exactly the opposite: when players leave a cartel
the remaining members stay together. These being the most extreme cases, in the
present paper we allow residuals to chose any of their most preferred partitions.
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Our model therefore generalises these approaches. In another respect it is a refine-
ment of the optimistic/pessimistic cores and we will also incorporate the status quo
approach to some extent.
We propose a new pair of optimistic and pessimistic approaches, but together,
as an “interval” rather than as individual concepts1. These differ crucially from
previous definitions in the treatment of the residual players. In our model they
are equally rational players who maximise their payoff in the same fashion as the
deviators. The result is a range that is much narrower than before, in particular, a
previously empty optimistic core may have elements in the new model.
The refinement will be done in two steps. After the introduction of some basic
concepts and the necessary notation, we give our first definition of dominance. Here
we assume that as a reaction to a deviation residuals form an outcome that is a
member of the core in the residual subgame. In our second definition we also use
the status quo, that is, pre-deviation partition of the residual players and this extra
piece of information enables us to reduce the set of possible payoffs arising as results
of the deviations further.
2. Basic definitions
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of players. Nonempty subsets of N are called
coalitions. A partition P is a set of disjoint coalitions, P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pk}, so
that their union is N . The set of partitions is Π the set of partitions of a given
subset S of N is Π(S).
The partition function
V : 2N ×Π −→ R(2.1)
(S,P) 7−→ V (S,P) whereS ∈ P.
is a mapping that assigns a value to each coalition in every partition.
Given a game (N,V ) an outcome is an ordered pair (x,P), where x ∈ RN
denotes the vector of payment allocations xi to the individual players i ∈ N and
xS ∈ RS its restriction to S ⊆ N . The vector of payment allocations must satisfy
a feasibility constraint namely that given a partition P, for all S ∈ P we have∑
i∈S xi ≤ V (S,P).
If x, y ∈ RN and S ⊆ N we write x >S y to say that for all i ∈ S, xi ≥ yi and
there exists i ∈ S such that xi > yi. For better transparency we will drop some
brackets when writing out partitions and thus write the partition {{1, 2, 5} , {3, 4}}
as (125, 34). This should lead to no confusion. If a is a partition of players in set
N1 and B is a set of partitions of the player set N2 such that N1 ∩N2 = ∅ then let
a ∪B = {a ∪ b |b ∈ B }.
Cornet [4, p32,37] defines the pessimistic and the optimistic core. He gives several
definitions of domination under the two approaches and we of those we use A3 and
B3, respectively:
An outcome (x,P) is dominated via the coalition S ⊆ N if
A3: (pessimistic approach) there exists a partition PS of S, such that for
all partitions P ′ ⊇ PS there exists a feasible outcome (x′,P ′) such that
x′ >S x.
B3: (optimistic approach) there exists a feasible outcome (x′,P ′), such that
P ′ ⊇ PS for some partition PS of S and x′ >S x.
The pessimistic approach follows the spirit of the α-core of Aumann and Peleg [2]
defined in the context of NTU CFGs, if we regard the partition formed by a set of
1The use of the word “interval” will be justified later when we show that the sets in question
satisfy certain inclusion relations, and so among them we can define a lower and an upper bound.
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players as its strategy. In this context the β-core is less appealing, but is certainly
far less optimistic than the above optimistic approach.
Definition 2.1 (Residual Game). Let (N,V ) be a game. Let S be a coalition and
R be its complement in N . Let S be a partition of S. The residual game (R, VS)
is the game over the player set R and with the partition function
VS : 2R ×Π −→ R(2.2)
(Q,R) 7−→ V (Q,R∪ S) ,
where R is a partition of R and Q ∈ R.
The residual game resembles to but is different from the concept of reduced game
especially in the form given by Moulin [11]. Reduced games are influenced by the
the payoff-structure of the larger game, but on the other hand do not account for
the significance of the partition of the “deleted” set S that influences the residual
payoffs in PFGs.
3. A recursive definition of the core
We define the core by induction2 on the number of players. It is indeed a pair
of definitions consisting of two core concepts based on optimistic and pessimistic
assumptions regarding the residual behaviour. We denote these by C− and C+
respectively.
Definition 3.1. Let (N,V ) be a game. The core of a game with N = {1} is
C+({1} , V ) = C−({1} , V ) =
{(
V
(
1, (1)
)
, (1)
)}
.
Assuming that the core is defined for every game consisting of at most k − 1
players we define the core of a game of k players in two steps:
(1) Dominance is defined in a game of k players under pessimistic and opti-
mistic assumptions giving rise to a pair of concepts of the inductive core.
Worst case scenario: If there exists a partition S of a subset S of N ,
such that either
(a) C−(R, VS) = ∅ and for all partitions Q ⊇ S there exists a payoff
vector y >S x, or
(b) C−(R, VS) 6= ∅ and for all partitions Q = S ∪ R that satisfy
(yR,R) ∈ C− (R, VS), moreover there exists a payoff vector y
such that y >S x
then the outcome (y,Q) dominates (x,P).
Best case scenario: If there exists a partition S of a subset S of N ,
such that either
(a) C+(R, VS) = ∅ and there exists a partition Q ⊇ S and a payoff
vector y >S x, or
(b) C+(R, VS) 6= ∅ and there exists a partition Q = S ∪R such that
(yR,R) ∈ C+ (R, VS), and a payoff vector y such that y >S x
then the outcome (y,Q) dominates (x,P).
(2) The core of a game of k players is the set of undominated outcomes.
3.1. Notes and properties. There are two new ideas in this definition. Firstly,
we consider residual games, that is, subgames restricted to some subset of the
players, but still experiencing the externalities of the deviating partition. Secondly,
we assume that the residual players play a game similar to the “big” game and
hence end up in a set of outcomes that is similar to the core of the entire game.
Since this core is contained in the outcome set of game (R, VS) the externalities
exerted by R may cause less extreme payoffs for the coalitions in S and hence for
2Our concept has no connection with the recursive core of Becker and Chakrabakti [3] where
the recursion is in time: the core is updated as the game is played.
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the individual players in S (We prove this later). Consequently our pessimistic
approach is less pessimistic than A3 of Cornet, and our optimistic approach is less
optimistic than B3 of Cornet. Before going any further we show that our definitions
indeed generalise the core of a characteristic function game.
Lemma 3.2. The core of a PFG is a generalisation of the core of a characteristic
function form game (CFG).
Proof. We show that if the partition function is of the form of a characteristic
function, that is, there are no externalities, then the pessimistic and optimistic
cores are identical to the core of a CFG with the given characteristic function. This
proves the lemma.
The proof is by induction.
For a game containing a single player our lemma is true.
Assuming that the result has been shown for all games with at most k−1 players,
we consider a game of k players. We consider an outcome (x,P) that is dominated
via S by (y,Q) via partition S ⊆ Q. Since the game contains no externalities
the deviation does not affect the payoff of the residual players. The worth of the
deviation is independent of the behaviour of the residual players and hence the
optimistic and pessimistic approaches give identical sets.
Further we note that the payoffs of the deviating coalitions in S do not depend
on each other, and so if there exist rational deviations, then there exists a coalition
S ⊆ N so that a deviation by S is profitable. This is identical to the classical
definition of the core. 
Cornet has already shown that CB3 ⊆ CA3. While this relation is easy to see,
the recursive definition makes the relation of the optimistic and the pessimistic core
less plausible.
Theorem 3.3. The pessimistic contains the optimistic core, that is,
(3.1) C+ ⊆ C−.
Proof. The proof is by induction in the number of players in a game.
For a game of a single player we have C+ = C− and so 3.1 is satisfied.
Assuming that C+ ⊆ C− is satisfied for all games with at most k − 1 players,
we consider a deviation S from an outcome (x,P) in a game of k players. As
the deviation includes at least one player, the residual game consists of at most
k − 1 players. The residual players, as a reaction, form a core-outcome in the
residual game whenever this is possible and if not then form any other outcome.
In either case by our assumption the best/worst case residual outcome sets Π+(R)
and Π−(R) satisfy
(3.2) Π+(R) ⊆ Π−(R).
We define a function that orders deviations by their profitability as a function of
the deviating partition as well as the residual partition. A deviation may include
several coalitions and so such an ordering is not obvious. However, as we only want
to know whether a given deviation is profitable or not under a certain residual
behaviour, the function
W : Π(S)×Π(R) −→ R(3.3)
(S,R) 7−→ W (S,R) = min
P∈S
{
V (P,S ∪R)−
∑
i∈P
xi
}
is suitable. Then for the given deviation S
(3.4) min
R∈Π−(R)
W (S,R) ≤ min
R∈Π+(R)
W (S,R) ≤ max
R∈Π+(R)
W (S,R)
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A profitable deviation in the pessimistic case it is profitable in the optimistic case,
too, hence for the game of k players we can conclude that the set of pessimistic
undominated outcomes contains that of the pessimistic ones. 
Since Π+(R) ⊆ Π−(R) ⊆ Π(R), using the same function W , we can show that
given an outcome (x,P) and a deviation S:
(3.5) min
R∈Π(R)
W (S,R) ≤ min
R∈Π−(R)
W (S,R)
and similarly
(3.6) max
R∈Π+(R)
W (S,R) ≤ max
R∈Π(R)
W (S,R).
Therefore we have the following result:
Lemma 3.4. The inductive core is a refinement of the classical optimistic - pes-
simistic core-pair:
(3.7) CB3 ⊆ C+ ⊆ C− ⊆ CA3.
In fact we can provide examples where the inclusions CB3 ⊆ C+ and C− ⊆ CA3
are strict.
3.2. Example. We define a game of 8 players. We summarise the coalitional pay-
offs in the following table (the rest of the payoffs are zero) :
1, 2, 3 4, 5, 6 7, 8
partition payoff partition payoff partition payoff
1, 2, 3 0,0,0 any 100 any 100
7, 8 2,24, 5, 6 1,1,1
78 0
7, 8 0,0123 1 456 3
78 6
45, 6
56, 4 2,1
7, 8 1,1
64, 5
78 2
other 0 any 0 any 0
Before starting to solve the game, notice that the payoff of 1, 2 and 3 is independent
of others’ actions. Similarly the payoffs of 4, 5 and 6 do not depend on the partition
of 7 and 8. These properties strongly simplify the calculations.
First look for the classical pessimistic core, CA3. Since at all partitions any
derivation carries the risk of becoming 0 for some partition of the residuals.
(3.8) CA3 =
{
(x,P)
∣∣∣∣∣∀P ∈ P ∈ Πf , ∑
i∈P
xi = V (P,P)
}
.
In the classical optimistic case, if (1, 2, 3) ⊂ P they will benefit from merging,
and in every other case all of deviations by {4, 5, 6}, or {7, 8} carry the possibility
of achieving 100 and so no outcomes are undominated.
(3.9) CB3 = ∅.
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For inductive cores we observe that the following residual cores are identical in
the optimistic and the pessimistic case:
C ({1, 2, 3} , VQ) =
(x,P)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(123)
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1
x1, x2, x3 ≥ 0

C ({1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} , VS) =
(x,P)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(123) ∪Π({4, 5, 6})
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1
x1, x2, x3 ≥ 0
x4 = x5 = x6 = 1
 ,
where Q and S are partitions of {4, 5, 6, 7, 8} and {7, 8} respectively.
Then in the optimistic case we have
(3.10) C+ =

(x,P)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(123, 456, 78)
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1
x1, x2, x3 ≥ 0
x4 = x5 = x6 = 1
x7 + x8 = 6
x7 ∈ [2, 4]

In the pessimistic case we expect the core to be at least as large as this. We
have:
C− =
(x,P)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(123, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1
x1, x2, x3 ≥ 0
x4 = x5 = x6 = 1
x7 = x8 = 2
∪
(123, 456, 78)
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1
x1, x2, x3, x7, x8 ≥ 0
x4 = x5 = x6 = 1
x7 + x8 = 6
(3.11)
∪
(123, ij, k, 78)
{i, j, k} = {4, 5, 6}
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1
x1, x2, x3, x7, x8 ≥ 0
x4 = x5 = x6 = 1
x7 + x8 = 2
∪
{123, ij, k, 7, 8}
{i, j, k} = {4, 5, 6}
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1
x1, x2, x3 ≥ 0
x4 = x5 = x6 = 1
x7 = x8 = 1

.
Indeed we find that
CB3 ⊆ C+ ⊆ C− ⊆ CA3.
4. Core
In the previous section we have defined the core in a way that has some very
nice internal consistency: The core is an equilibrium concept and in the case of a
deviation the rest of the players form a new outcome obeying the same equilibrium
concept. We, however have another piece information, yet unused, namely the
status quo residual partition: the partition that remains when the deviating players
are deleted. It is clear that this partition, that we denote by R0 influences the set
of outcomes that can be formed. For instance if the status quo is undominated,
no other outcomes can arise. Of course, this definition is not an improvement
if all residual cores are empty. We define the core of a partition function game
inductively over the number of players.
Definition 4.1. Let (N,V ) be a game. The core of a game with N = {1} is
C+({1} , V ) = C−({1} , V ) =
{(
V
(
1, (1)
)
, (1)
)}
. The outcome (y, (1)) dominates
(x, (1)) if y > x. In this trivial case the definition of sequential domination is
identical to that of domination.
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Assuming that the core and the dominance relation have been defined for every
game consisting of at most k − 1 players, we define the core of a game of k players
in three steps:
(1) Dominance is defined in a game of k players under pessimistic and opti-
mistic assumptions giving rise to a pair of concepts of the core.
Worst case scenario: If there exists a partition S of a subset S of N ,
such that either
(a) C−(R, VS) = ∅ and for all partitions Q ⊇ S there exists a payoff
vector y >S x, or
(b) C−(R, VS) 6= ∅ and for all partitions Q = S ∪ R that satisfy
(yR,R) ∈ C− (R, VS), moreover there exists a payoff vector y
such that (yR,R) sequentially dominates (xR,R0) and y >S x
then the outcome (y,Q) dominates (x,P).
Best case scenario: If there exists a partition S of a subset S of N ,
such that either
(a) C+(R, VS) = ∅ and there exists a partition Q ⊇ S and a payoff
vector y >S x, or
(b) C+(R, VS) 6= ∅ and there exists a partition Q = S ∪R such that
(yR,R) ∈ C+ (R, VS), and a payoff vector y such that (yR,R)
sequentially dominates (xR,R0) and y >S x
then the outcome (y,Q) dominates (x,P).
(2) We say that the outcome (y,R) sequentially dominates (x,P) if there exists
a sequence of outcomes (x,P) = (x0,P0) , . . . , (xk,Pk) = (y,R) such that
for all 1 < i ≤ k (xi,Pi) dominates (xi−1,Pi−1).
(3) The core of a game of k players is the set of undominated outcomes of the
game.
4.1. Notes and properties. The difference between the core and the inductive
core is in the introduction of sequential dominance. Players are assumed to be
myopic so that sequential domination is only possible via a sequence of (direct)
dominations.
Lemma 4.2. The above defined concept gives a generalisation of the core of a CFG.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.2 
Lemma 4.3. The core is refinement of the inductive core and it satisfies
(4.1) CB3 ⊆ C+ ⊆ C∗+ ⊆ C∗− ⊆ C− ⊆ CA3.
Proof. The result is established the same way as Lemma 3.4, so we only sketch the
required steps. First we prove C∗+ ⊆ C∗− as in Theorem 3.3. Then prove C+ ⊆ C∗+
and C∗− ⊆ C using the same technique as in the proof of Lemma 3.4. Then, using
Lemma 3.4 itself the result follows. 
4.2. Example. We return to our example in 3.2, and calculate the core both in the
optimistic and in the pessimistic case. The calculations are similar to our previous
ones except that residuals are only expected to move to a new outcome that is in
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the conditional core and dominates the status quo. We get:
C∗+ = C
∗
− =
(x,P)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
{123, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1
x1, x2, x3 ≥ 0
x4 = x5 = x6 = 1
x7 = x8 = 2
∪
{123, 456, 78}
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1
x1, x2, x3, x7, x8 ≥ 0
x4 = x5 = x6 = 1
x7 + x8 = 6
∪
{123, ij, k} ∪ P ({7, 8})
i, j, k ∈ {4, 5, 6}
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1
x1, x2, x3 ≥ 0
x4 = x5 = x6 = x7 = x8 = 1
(4.2)
Comparing this result to the previous one we find that
CB3 ⊆ C+ ⊂ C∗+ = C∗− ⊂ C− ⊆ CA3.
5. Postscript
The two new pairs of definitions weaken our assumptions about the residual
behaviour and at the same time give a refinement of earlier concepts. The internally
consistency of the definition is theoretically nice and gives a lot more subtle way to
understand partition function games.
Where it does not help is the case of an empty core. All four core concepts
defined here are subsets of the classical pessimistic core. If we generate a character-
istic function by the most commonly used method of taking a coalition’s minimal
obtainable worth in the partition function case to be its coalitional payoff, the pes-
simistic core is identical to the core of the coalitional game thus created. It is clear
then that if the classical pessimistic core is empty, all our definitions produce empty
cores.
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